In his work on information packaging-i.e., the structuring of propositional content in function of the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's information state Vallduvi (1992, 1993, 1994) identifies the informational primitives fo cus, link and tail, which are adapted from the traditional focus/ground and topic/comment ap proaches, and argues that the exploitation of information states of hearers by the information-packaging strategies of speakers reveals that these states have at least the internal structure of a system of Heimian file cards: links, which correspond to what are traditionally known as topics, say where-on what file card-the focal information goes, and tails indicate how it fits there. Since there are various reasons for not believing this, the present paper proposes to model information states as Kampian discourse representation structures, without locations. This requires and leads to a different perspective on the function of links. They signal non-monotone anaphora: their discourse referent Y is anaphoric to an antecedent discourse marker X such that X � Y. This idea will be shown to subsume 'non-identity' anaphora, contrastive stress, pronoun referent resolution, and restrictiveness of relatives and adjectives.
Information Packaging
The notion of information packaging is introduced in Chafe (1976) 
[The phenomena at issue] have to do primarily with how the message is sent and only secondarily with the message itself, just as the packaging of toothpaste can affect sales in partial independence of the quality of the tooth paste inside. (Chafe 1976: 28) The basic idea is that speakers do not present information in an unstructured way, but that they provide a hearer with detailed instructions on how to manipulate and integrate this information according to their beliefs about the hearer's knowledge and attentional state:
To ensure re a�onably efficient communication, [ ... t] he speaker tries, to the best of his ability, to make the structure of his utterances congruent with his knowledge of the listener's mental world. (Clark and Haviland 1977: 5 ) On all levels the crucial factor appears to be the tailoring of an utterance by a sender to meet the particular assumed needs of the intended receiver.
That is, information packaging in natural languge reflects the sender's hypotheses about the receiver's assumptions and beliefs and strategies. (Prince 1981: 224) For instance, sentences such as (1) and (2) are truth-conditionally equivalent in that they express the same proposition, but each of them 'packages' this proposition in a prosodic ally different way: !
(1)
The boss hates BROCCOU (2)
The boss HATES broccoli
Typically, speakers will use (1) if the hearer at the time of utterance knows nothing about or is not attending to the boss' relation to broccoli, while they will use (2) if the hearer at the time of utterance knows that there exists a relation between the boss and broccoli, is attending to this relation, but does not know what it is. Apparently, speakers are sensitive to such differences in the hearer's knowledge and attentional state, and hearers rely on this:
speakers not using this device systematically give their listeners a harder time. (Nooteboom and Terken 1982: 317) Truth-conditionally equivalent sentences encoding different information packaging instructions are not mutually interchangeable salva fe licitate in a given context of utterance: for example, of the above sentences, only the first one is a fe licitous answer to the question What does the boss hate ? It is this context-sensitivity that has traditionally placed information packaging within the realm of pragmatics.
Vallduvf's account of information packaging (1992, 1993, 1994 ) is a combi nation of two influential earlier pragmatic approaches, the 'topic/comment' approach and the 'focus/ground' approach. According to the focus/ground approach, sentences consist of a 'focus' and a 'ground'. 2 The focus is the informative part of the sentence, the part that (the speaker believes) makes some contribution to the hearer's mental state. The ground is the non-informative part of the sentence, the part that anchors the sentence to what is already established or under discussion in (the speaker's picture of) the hearer's mental state. Although sentences may lack a ground altogether, sentences without focus do not exist.
The topic/comment approach splits the set of subexpressions of a sentence into a 'topic', the-typically sentence-initial-part that expresses what the sentence is about, and a 'comment', the part that expresses what is said about the topic. Topics are points of departure for what the sentence conveys, they link it to pre vious discourse. Sentences may be topicless: so-called 'presentational' or 'news' sentences consist entirely of a comment.
In Reinhart (1982) , it is argued that the dimension of 'old' I'new' information is irrelevant for the analysis of sentence topics. Instead, the notion of 'pragmatic aboutness' is is defined in terms ofthe organization of information. The set of Possi ble Pragmatic Assertions that can be made with a sentence S expressing proposition cp is defined as PPA ( s ) = {cp} U {(a, cp) I a is the interpretation of an NP in S 3 } A pragmatic assertion (a, cp) is assumed to be about the NP interpretation a.
Notice, by way of example (adopted from Dahl 1974) Roughly speaking, the diffe re nt parts-focus and ground, link and tai l-o f a sen tence S have the fo llowing informational fu nctions. The focus encodes Is , the information of S, which can he metaphorically described as Cis , the proposition expressed by S, minus l\'h , the information (the speaker presumes) already present in the hearer's information state.
The ground performs an ushering role-it specifies the way in which Is fi ts in the hearer's information state: links indicate where Is should go by denoting a location in the hearer's information state, and tails indicate how Is fits there by signaling a certain mode of information update. Of course, talking about ushering information to some location in the hearer's information state presupposes that this information state has some sort of internal structure. In this respect, Vallduvf purports to agree with Heim that there has to be some additional internal structure in the hearer's model of the common ground that plays an important role in natural language interpretation, even if this internal structure is of tangential relevance in truth value computation. It is this internal structure of information states which is, in fact, crucially exploited by the different information-packaging strategies used by speakers in In fact, Vallduvf takes the metaphor of Heim's file change semantics (1982, 1983) literally, in that he assumes that the information in the hearer's model is organized in files, i.e., collections of file cards. Each file card represents a discourse entity: its attributes and its links with other discourse entities are recorded on the card in the form of conditions. Such a discourse entity may be known to the hearer but not salient at the time of utterance, it may be salient at the time of utterance, it may be completely new to the hearer, it may be inferable from what the hearer knows. etc. Discourse entities mediate between referring expressions (noun phrases) and entities in the real world: indefinite noun phrases prompt hearers to create a new file card, and definite noun phrases incite them to retrieve an already existing file card. Both definites and pronouns denote already existing file cards. but pronouns denote salient file cards, whereas (other) definites refer to non-salient ones.
File change comprises the above aspects of file card management. but it also involves content update, i.e., the incorporation of information conveyed by a given sentence into records on novel and familiar file cards, and this is where Vallduvi lets information packaging come in.
Links are associated with so-called GOTO instructions. In fi le change seman tics, the target location of such a declaration is a file card je. A tail points at an information record-normally a (possibly underspecified) condition--on such a fi le card, RECORD(jc) , and indicates that it has to be modified (or further specified) by the focus information Is of the sentence. The associated instruction type is called UPDATE-REPLACE. In the absence of a tail, the focus information Is of a sentence is simply added at the current location. The associated instruction typc is called
UPDATE-ADD.
Sentences may lack links and tails (recall that the foc us is the only non-op-tional part of a sentence), so the following four sentence types can be distinguished: As regards the first example, suppose that a newly appointed temp is ordering dinner for the boss and asks the executive secretary whether there is anything that should known about the boss' taste. The executive secretary gives the following answer:
Example (10) is a link-focus construction. and as such it is therefore associated with a aaro(jC)(UPDATE-ADD(1s » instruction. The link subject the boss specifies a locus of update je , viz .
• the card representing the boss-card #25. say. The focus verb phrase hates broccoli specifies the information Is that has to be added to this card. Suppose that broccoli is represented by card #136. Then. passng over some formal details. the UPDATE-ADD(1s ) instruction associated with the focus hates broccoli amounts to adding the condition 'ha With this focus-tail example, the speaker instructs the hearer to replace the record on the current locus of update-<:ard #17, say, for John--expressing that the value of card #17 is dead by one saying that he is not dead. In short, the tail serves to highlight a condition on file card #17, the one saying its value is dead. This condition is then modified in the way specified by the material in the foc us. In addition to the option of replacing a record on a file card, there is the pos sibility of further specifying an underspecified record, something which is assumed to be going on in the link-focus-tail example (13) given below. Suppose now that the newly appointed temp asks the executive secretary whether it was a good idea to order broccoli for the boss, and that the executive secretary gives the following answer:
The idea is that the temp has an underspecified record on his card for the boss, which says that the boss has some attitude towards broccoli. The lack of information about the nature of this attitude is reflected by the record 'ATI', and it is this record which is replaced by 'hate' after hearing the executive secretary's answer (13) In English, the focus is associated with a H* pitch accent (written in small caps), links are marked by a L+H* pitch accent (written in boldface), and tails are structurally characterized by being deaccented. One and the same string may be assigned different intonational phrasings in order to realize different informational interpretations. In particular, the focal pitch accent may be realized on different positions in the sentence. This is illustrated by the sentences (15), (17) and (19), construed as answers to the questions (14), (16) In Catalan, the situation is as fo llows. Metaphorically speaking, one can say that Catalan focal elements remain within a so-called 'core clause', but that ground elements are 'detached' to a clause-peripheral position. In particular, links are detached to the left, and non-link ground elements undergo right-detachment. As a result of detaching both links and tails, the core clause CCC) is left containing only the focus of the sentence:
Consider the Catalan counterparts (21), (22) and (23) of (15), (17) and (19), re spectively. The all-focus sentence (21 ) displays the basic verb-object-subject word order. In (22) and (23), the link subject l'amo has been detached to the left. In (23), moreover, the tail direct object el broquil has been detached to the right, leaving a clitic (1 ') in the focal core clause. Note that intonational structure plays a part in Catalan too, albeit 'a rather lame one' (Vallduvf 1993: 33): a focal H* pitch acent is invariably associated with the last item of the core clause.
( 2 1 Acccording to most approaches, focused constituents are semantic functors which take the non-focused part of the sentence as their argument. This analysis is ba.,ed on such assumptions as made in SzaboJcsi (198 1, 1983) and Svoboda and Materna (1987 ) , where foc us is not only considered an information-packaging prim itive but also an implicit truth-conditional exhaustiveness operator, and on semantic studies of the phenomenon of 'association with focus' as provided by Jacobs (1983) , Rooth (1985) , Krifka (1991) , and others who have argued that the quantificational structure of so-called focus-sensitive operators is crucially determined by the tra ditional pragmatic focus-ground partition. However, Vallduvf argues convincingly that 'the claim that foc used constituents truth-conditionally entail exhaustiveness leads to extreme positions' (1992: 170) , and Vallduvf and Zacharski (1993) show that 'association with pragmatic focus' is not an inherent semantic property of 'focus-sensitive' operators, which may express their semantics on partitions other than the focus-ground one-witness obvious cases of association with subsegments of the informational focus, with links, and with other parts of the ground.
This dissociation of the pragmatic focus-background distinction from issues of exhaustiveness and focus-sensitivity dispels the need of analyzing focused con stituents as operators which semantically take scope over the non-focused parts of the sentence, which can be considered an advantage. As sentences may lack links and tails, such analyses do not immediately reflect the core status of the focus, which is the only non-optional part of a sentence. In some sense, then, all-focus sentences constitute the basic case, and the cases where there is a ground are derived from such basic all-focus structures.
. ... To Boxes
We saw that concerning the 'internal structure of information states which is, in fac t, crucially exploited by the different information-packaging strategies used by speakers in pursuing communicative efficiency' (1994: 7), Vallduvl concludes that it is at least a system of file cards connected by Hypercard-style pointers: information packaging instructions contribute in two ways to the optimization of information update, since they provide means to designate a file card as the locus of information update and hence circumvent the redundancy of multiple update, and they identify the information of the sentence and its relation to information already present in the hearer's model. This conclusion is challenged in Hendriks and Dekker (1996) , who ar gue that it is begging the question: if file card systems are assumed, then the information-packaging strategies do seem to contribute to efficient information ex change. Nevertheless, the more theoretical question is whether this assumption itself is justified, and whether the organization of linguistic information exchange really presupposes such information states. After all, ushers can be very useful, but there are also halls that have unnumbered seats ! For instance, files are , as Va llduvl puts it, 'dimensionally richer' than the card-less discourse representation structures of Discourse Representation Theory (see Kamp 1981, Kamp and Reyle 1993) , since each file card introduces its own 'representational space' where all its records are to be fo und while there is no sensible notion of location in discourse representation structures. Still, a hearer who employs discourse representation structures has an easier job from a bookkeeping perspective than a hearer whose information states are collections of file cards connected by pointers. Besides, one can show that given Vallduvl's specific use of pointers to file cards, there is actually a one-to-one cor respondence between his files and the class of discourse representation structures with atomic conditions and one marked discourse referent, the 'current locus of update'. The corresponding systems differ only in the way in which they display their information: on several cards, or in one big box. So, in a sense Vallduvi's conclusion is unfalsifiable.
Moreover, it can be shown that the idea that links specify a locus of update disjunctive information has to be put in the non-metaphorical file card set-up of Vallduvi (1994) . (Heim (1983: 184 ) touches on similar questions.) Second, the existence of sentences with more than one link (Vallduvi (1992 : 104) ) raises the question what sense multiple loci of update can make that Hypercard-style pointers cannot. Third, the replacement operation triggered by the presence of tails, by itself far from unproblematic, is severely complicated by the use of file cards. And fo urth, since pronouns do not necessarily induce replacement or shift the locus of update, one is forced to the counterintuitive conclusion that they form part of the focus.
(The interested reader is referred to Hendriks and Dekker (1996) .) Thus, the data do not enforce the conclusion that information states have at least the structure of a collection of file cards connected by pointers. For that matter, the phenomena can also be accounted for in terms of discourse representation structures, and it is very well possible that circumventing file cards might lead to the avoidance of the complications outlined above. In view of these considerations, a card-less alternative will be defended in the present section, according to which information states are modelled by means of discourse representation structures, which are ontologically less committed than the 'dimensionally richer' file card system, in that discourse representation structures do not come with locations.
But if the use of files does not appear to be imperative, then a question must be faced: what purpose do links serve if they do not serve to specify a locus of update by ushering to locations? What does 'ushering to a location' mean if representations do not come with locations? A different perspective on the fu nction of links is required. The perspective offered below carries less presuppositions than the file metaphor. It has its heuristic starting point in Kamp and Reyle (1993) , who note that processing a plural pronoun does not always involve equating the discourse referent it introduces with one introduced earlier through the processing of some other plural NP. They consider the fo llowing example:
(24) John took Mary to Acapulco. They had a lousy time.
Here, the plural pronoun they does not have a single NP for its antecedent. Rather, the 'antecedent' has to be 'constructed' out of various parts of the preceding text. Such examples, which are very common, seem to suggest that plural pronouns can pick up any antecedent that can be obtained from antecedent information by logical deduction. However, the deductive principles that are permitted in this context tum out to be subject to restrictions.
(25) Eight of the ten balls are in the bag. They are under the sofa .
The pronoun they in (25) cannot be understood as referring to the two balls that are missing from the bag. Apparently, subtracting one set from another is not a permissible operation for the formation of pronominal antecedents.
The permissible process of antecedent fonnation displayed by (24) is called Summation: a new discourse referent is introduced which represents the 'union' of individuals (John and Mary) and/or sets represented by discourse referents that are already part of the discourse representation structure. Other permissible processes are Abstraction, exemplified by (26), which allows the introduction of discourse referents for quantified NPs (compare also footnote 7 above), and Kind Introduction, which introduces discourse referents for a certain 'genus' explicitly mentioned in the text by a (simple or complex) noun. If they in (27) refers to the (few) men who joined the (conservative) party, we are dealing with Abstraction. The more natural reading, where they refers to men in general (and the party is presumably non-conservative), is a case of Kind Introduction.
(26) I fo und every book Bill needs. They are on his desk.
(27) Fe w men joined the party. They are very conservative.
In their discussion of the inferential processes available for the construction of antecedents for (plural) pronouns, Kamp and Reyle suggest the following:
What sets the admissible inference processes of Summation, Abstrac tion and Kind Introduction apart from an inadmissible inference pattern such as set subtraction is that the fonner are [ ... ] strictly positive (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 344) , or 'cumulative' in the following sense: the newly created discourse ref erent represents an entity of which the discourse referents used in the application of the rule represent (atomic or non-atomic) parts. (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 394) Notice that, when this generalization is taken in conjunction with a principle to the extent that anaphora invariably involves the addition of an equational condition 'X = Y' for an anaphoric expression with discourse referent Y and a-possibly infer entially created-antecedent discourse referent X (and such an equational approach is standard practice in Dicourse Representation Theory), the necessary result will be that anaphora is always (upward) monotone: if an expression with discourse referent Y is anaphorically dependent on an expression with discourse referent X, then X c,;; Y. The latter result, however, does not seem to be borne out by the facts. For example, Van Deemter (1992 , 1994a ) presents ca�es of 'non-identity anaphora' along the lines of (28), as well as minimal pairs such as (29) and (30): (28) Our neighours are extremely nice PEOPLE.
He is a TEACHER, she is a HOUSEWIFE. It can be observed that the pronouns he and she are anaphorically dependent on our neighbours in (28), but that the discourse referents of the pronouns represent entities which are proper subsets of the entity represented by the discourse referent of the antecedent: obvious cases of non-monotone anaphora. Moreover, whereas the read ing of (29) where the cats is anaphoric to the ANIMALS strongly and monotonously suggests that all animals fed by John were cats, the reading of (30) where the cats is anaphoric to the ANIMALS does not. It even seems to imply that John fed at least one non-cat. s Again, we are dealing with non-monotone anaphora. Note that the texts (29) and (30) differ only in the assignment of L+H* accent to the noun phrase the cats, which is the distinguishing mark of links in English. Hence our alternative hypothesis:
(3 1 ) Non-Monotone Anaphora Hypothesis (NAH):
Linkhood (marked by L+H* accent in English) serves to signal non-monotone anaphora. If an expression is a link, then its discourse referent Y is anaphoric to an antecedent discourse referent X such that X � Y.
As we will show, this hypothesis affects arange of phenomena. It subsumes not only the so-called 'non-identity' anaphora just exemplified and analyzed in Van Deemter (1992 , 1994a , but also the cases of contrastive stress discussed in Rooth (1992) and Val lduvf (1992 Val lduvf ( , 1994 . It contributes to an explanation of the effect of pitch accenting on pronoun referent resolution noted in Cahn (1995) , Kameyama (1994 ), Vallduvf (1994 , among many others, and it sheds light on the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses and adjectives (see Kamp and Reyle 1993) .
(a) The relationship between non-identity anaphora and linkhood can be illustrated even more saliently with relational nouns: (32) Te n guys were playing basketball in the RAIN.
Th efathers were having FUN.
(33) Te n guys were playing basketball in the RAIN. The fathers were having FUN.
Thus, while (32) has an 'identity' reading where the fa thers is anaphoric to ten guys which suggests that all ten guys playing basketball in the rain were fathers who were having fu n, and (33) has a 'subsectional' reading where the fathers is anaphoric to ten guys which suggests that the fathers who were having fun constitute a proper subset of the ten basketball-playing guys, the latter text also has a-non monotone-'relational' reading where the fathers of the ten guys playing basketball in the rain were having fu n. Observe. by the way, that Kamp and Reyle's example (24) of Summation, a case of monotone non-identity anaphora in which the pronoun they typically apears unaccented, shows that is not so much the 'non-identity' as the 'non-monotonicity' of the anaphora which is responsible for the L+H* accent (that is: the linkhood) of the anaphor.
(b) According to Rooth, contrast is the cornerstone of the interpretation of focus phenomena: 'Intonational focus has a semantic import related to the intuitive notion of contrast within a set of alternative elements ' (1992: 113) For grammatical reasons (parallellism), the preferred antecedents for the unstressed pronouns he and him in (36) are Pa ul and Jim, respectively. The preferences are reverse for the stressed pronouns he and him in (37).10 In the theory of Kameyama (1994) , this phenomenon is accounted for as follows:
• A grammar subsystem represents the space of possibilities and a pragmatics subsystem represents the space of preferences;
• Stressed and unstressed pronouns have the same denotational range. i.e .. the same range of possihle values;
• Complementary Preference Hypothesis (CPH): A stressed pronoun takes the complementary preference of the unstressed counterpart.
Note, however. that the NA H formulated in (3 1) actually predicts the CPH effec ts: adding L+H* accent to pronouns means the addition of a pragmatic signal that the anaphora involved is non-monotone. In the case of singular an tecedents with entity representing discourse referents. this means that the anaphor does not not eorder with its antecedent. As a-surprising--consequence. we have that pronominal stress turns the grammatically determined preference for a certain antecedent into a pragmatically determined preference for non-reference with that antecedent.
(d) The sentences (38) and (39) (taken from Kamp and Reyle 1993 : 255) illustrate the familiar rule of English orthography that non-restrictive clauses are set apart from the surrounding text by commas, but that restrictive clauses are not.
(38) The son who attended a boarding school was insufferable.
(39) The son, who attended a boarding school, was insufferable.
Note that (38), in which the relative clause is used restrictively, suggests that there is more than one son, but only one who is boarding. In (39), where the relative clause is used non-restrictively, the suggestion is rather that there is only one son, of whom it is said not only that he was insufferable but also, parenthetically as it were, that he attended a boarding school. If the prosody of these sentences is taken into account, it will be clear that this pragmatic difference is in keeping with the NA H as formulated in (3 1). Similar observations can be made with respect to the (non-)restrictiveness of the adjectives and nouns in (42) (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 372) .
(40) The son who attended a boarding school was INSUFFERABLE.
(41) The son, who attended a BOARDING SCHOOL, was INSUFFERABLE.
(42) lohn fe d the ANIMALS .
Endnotes
The young cats were HUNGRY.
O. This paper is an abridged and-somewhat-improved version of Hendriks and Dekker (1996) . Most notably, a radical reduction has been applied to its second section, the part of the paper that reflects joint work of the two authors . The present author would like to thank Paul Dekker, Elisabet Engdahl. Sieb Nootehoom. Ta nya Reinhart and Enric Val lduvf for stimulation. cooperation and discussion. I. Italics will be used for unaccented expressions, SMALL CAPS for expressions that bear a (focal) H* pitch accent. and boldface for expressions that bear a L+H * pitch accent. This is the terminology of Pierrehumbert (1980) and Pierrehumhert and Hirschberg (1990) . H* accent and L+H* accent are called A accent and B accent. respectively, in lackendoff (1972). We will assume that the relevant intonational unit for links is not the accent but rather the whole phra�e. so that there is no such thing as a link-associated accent, but rather a link-associated tune.
2. The ground is also known as ' presupposition' and a� 'open proposition'. 3. Subject to further syntactic and semantic restrictions. cf. footnote 7 below.
4.
Observe that to the extent that links correspond to the topic in the traditional topic/comment distinction, Vallduvi's theory is quite similar to the analysis of sentence topics presented in Reinhart (1982) , where a pragmatic assertion of :.; about 0 is formalized as (0, ip), in that 0 functions as a kind of 'locus of update' for ip (cf. below). A difference is that Reinhart allows assertions without a topic (since also ip E PPA(s» and topics that express new information. 5. The hierarchy does not imply constituency or (even) continuity. In particular, the two parts (link and tail) of the ground may not constitute a linear unit at the surface. Moreover, sentences may have more than one link, and more than one element may constitute the tail.
6. Note, moreover, that the structural realization of information packaging in Catalan involves both syntax and prosody.
7. Though 'links tend to be definite NPs' (1992: 77), Vallduvi observes the 'restricted existence of indefinite links ' (1992: 46) . 'Sentences with quantifier links are' claimed to be 'less natural than others, causing raised eyebrows among some Catalan speakers. Sentences like A tots els estudiantsi elsi donen un CARNET ti "To all students they give an ID" or A tothom; no eli tracten ti IGUAL "Everybody they don't treat the same" are extremely natural, some other sentences sound odder. Most sentences, however, are fe licitous once the right context is construed, although in some cases it may require some sophistication' (Vallduvi 1992: 153) . Analogously, Reinhart notes that if they 'can be interpreted (pragmatically) as denoting sets, universally quantified NPs, as well as specific and generic indefinite NPs, can serve as topics ' (1982: 65-66 ).
8. 'Strongly suggests' and 'seems to imply' instead of 'entails', since though the effects are quite strong, they are of a pragmatic, rather than a logico-semantic, nature. See also (c), on pronoun referent resolution, below.
9.
Nor is contrariety (as proposed in Van Deemter 1994b) , witness:
Where can I find the cutlery?
The fo rks are in the CUPBOARD, and the knives TOO.
10. The fact that (37) insinuates that calling someone a Republican is an insult is essentially due to the de-accenting of insulted in the second sentence of (37).
